IFCO 6085 - Nuclear Deterrence
IFCO 6085 · Semestre d'automne 2026-2027
- Langue d'enseignement
- English
- Type d'enseignement
- Cours magistral
- Nombre d'heures
- 24
- Crédits
- 4
Informations
Descriptif
For eight decades, a central paradox has defined the nuclear age: the weapons designed to make great-power war unthinkable have instead made the permanent threat of war a structural feature of international politics. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is not in serious dispute. What remains deeply contested is which configuration of nuclear forces best minimizes the likelihood of their use and whether any strategy or doctrine can avert nuclear war indefinitely.
Efforts to prevent nuclear use have been dominated by the concept of deterrence — a logic not unique to the nuclear age, but one that has assumed special centrality within it. In its simplest form, deterrence holds that the threat of nuclear attack is negated by the possibility of retaliation in kind, which in turn requires forces capable of surviving a surprise attack and carrying out the retaliatory mission.
This course examines nuclear deterrence from multiple disciplinary perspectives. Students will engage with deterrence both as a strategic doctrine and as an object of critique: its assumptions about rationality, its requirements for clear signalling between states, and its focus on perceptions of capability and resolve have each been challenged by historians, psychologists, ethicists, and legal scholars.
Beyond these theoretical foundations, the course addresses the nuclear politics of the present: multipolarity, coercion in live conflicts, the erosion of arms control agreements, and the destabilising potential of artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, and cyber capabilities.
Students will learn to analyse deterrence rigorously and to assess whether any strategy can prevent nuclear use over the long run.
Pré-requis
It is a fundamental course.
Format pédagogique
Weekly two-hour lectures across twelve sessions, combining conceptual exposition, historical cases, and current policy debates.
Mode de validation
- A midterm examination assessing students’ understanding of key concepts and theories (70%).
- A final individual policy paper requiring students to apply course concepts to a contemporary nuclear security challenge and develop evidence-based policy recommendations (30%).
Lectures
Lectures principales 4
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Freedman, Lawrence, and Jeffrey Michaels. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. 4th ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
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Miller, Steven E., ed. Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence: An International Security Reader. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
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Narang, Vipin, and Scott D. Sagan, eds. The Fragile Balance of Terror: Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2023.
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Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966.
Unités pédagogiques
| N° d'UP | Type d'UP | Unités pédagogiques | Enseignants | Nombre d'heures | Crédits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19337 | Cours magistral | Nuclear Deterrence | Yigaram PARK, Nicole GRAJEWSKI | 24 | 4 |
| 20924 | Teaching assistant | TA Nuclear Deterrence | Yigaram PARK | 16 | — |
Enseignants
- Yigaram PARK
- Nicole GRAJEWSKI
Dans les maquettes
- Formation Académique Commune (FAC) - Semestre d'automne 2026-2027FORMATION ACADEMIQUE COMMUNE (MASTERS)
Contacts et ressources
- Contact pédagogique
- IODICE Marina