ODEC 4085 - Law and Economics

ODEC 4085 · Semestre d'automne 2026-2027

Langue d'enseignement
English
Type d'enseignement
Cours séminaire
Nombre d'heures
24
Crédits
4

Informations

Descriptif

This course provides an introduction to“law and economics”, the movement, school of thought and methodology. It traces its historical development and places it within both economics and law. Throughout the course we will explore its positive and normative assumptions, perspectives and methodologies. We will also discuss various critiques levied against its main tenets. Exploring the writings of some of the main advocates for and against this school of thought and methodology - the aim is to depict a complete picture where the assessment of the application, principles and ideologies of this movement can be critically investigated. The class will be divided in three parts, after an introductory class, Part I. will focus on a narrative of the history of law and economics. In this part we will get acquainted with some of the most important writers that have paved the way for the modern mainstream law and economics movement to be born in the 1960s, such as: Pareto, Kaldor, Coase and Posner. Part II. will then discuss the modern mainstream L&E foundations, both methodologically and normatively and then we will move to three critiques: the structural, the distributional and the behavioral. Then in Part III. we will look at applied L&E in three fields, torts (accident law), criminal law and family law.

Format pédagogique

COURSE OBJECTIVES:

  • Develop a basic understanding of the methodology, application and ideology of law and economics

as a school of thought

  • Evaluate critically the different aspects of this influential movement
  • Formulate a well-informed opinion about the different aspects of law and economics, regarding both

its positive and normative analysis

Mode de validation

  • Participation: Students are asked to read the assignments prior to class and to participate in class

discussions – students will be asked to participate on two panels from different parts of the class.

A sign-up sheet will be shared 20%

  • Paper: Students are asked to write a paper about an economists or jurists highlighting their

contribution to law and economics (5000 words). A sign-up sheet will be shared to select. Papers

are due on the last day of classes 40%

  • Final Exam: Students will take a final exam scheduled during exam week, 2 hours 40%

Charge de travail

The course will rely on several textbooks and articles. The material will be uploaded onto google drive.

Students are required to read before each class. Readings are organized as required and suggested readings.

If you have time go through the suggested readings otherwise, focus only on the required ones.

Lectures

Lectures principales 5

  1. Amartya Sen, Economic Methodology: Heterogeneity and Relevance, 71(3) Social Research (Fall 2004) pp. 583 - 606.

    Lire en ligne

  2. Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities,34 AMER. L. REV. 939 (1985) pp. 939 – 967.

    Lire en ligne

  3. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 STANFORD L. REV. 993 (1990) pp. 993 - 1038 and pp. 1056 - 1058.

    Lire en ligne

  4. Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986), Preface and pp. 1 - 24.

    Emprunter

  5. Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed., 2004), Chapter 1.Introduction pp.1 - 7.

    Emprunter

Lectures secondaires 18

  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, Chapter 17, pp. 147 – 156.

    Emprunter

  2. Allan Feldman, Pareto Optimality in Palgrave Encyclopedia of Law and Economics p. 5 - 9.

    Lire en ligne

  3. Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) - please read pp. 1473 - 1489 and pp. 1541 - 1547.

    Lire en ligne

  4. Dina I. Waked, Development Studies through the Lens of Critical Law and Economics: Efficiency and Redistribution Revisited in Market Structure Analyses in the South, 5(4) TLT (2014) pp. 649–666.

    Lire en ligne

  5. Dina I. Waked, Sense and Nonsense of the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, in J. Le Bourg, C.Quézel-Ambrunaz (ed.), Sens et non sens du droit de la responsabilité civile, Presses Université Savoie Mont Blanc (2018) pp. 1 – 22.

    Emprunter

  6. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV.387 (1981) pp. 387 - 445.

    Lire en ligne

  7. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MARYLAND L. REV. 563 (1982) pp. 604-614.

    Lire en ligne

  8. Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968) pp. 169 - 172; 207 - 209 (skim through the model).

    Lire en ligne

  9. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law : Does Tort Law Really Deter? 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377 (1994-1995) pp. 377 - 390 (suggested further reading: 393 - 397 (Motorist liability) and 422 – 443).

    Lire en ligne

  10. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Law and Economics in the United States: a brief historical survey, 19 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON., 331 (1995) pp. 331 - 348.

    Lire en ligne

  11. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than Income Tax in Redistributing Income 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) pp. 667 – 677.

    Lire en ligne

  12. Mnookin and Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88(5) Yale L. J. (1979) pp. 950-984.

    Lire en ligne

  13. Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, The Economic Journal Vol. 49 (1939) pp. 549 - 552.

    Lire en ligne

  14. Richard A. Posner, An economic theory of the criminal law, 85(6) Columbia L. Rev. (1985) pp.1193 - 1231 (excluding “C: Recklessness, Negligence and Strict Liability Again).

  15. Richard Epstein, Surrogacy : The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2305 (1995), pp. 2305-2341.

    Lire en ligne

  16. Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998) please read pp. 1551 - 1561 and p. 1575.

    Lire en ligne

  17. Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) pp.103 – 136.

    Lire en ligne

  18. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) pp. 1 - 44.

    Lire en ligne

Unités pédagogiques

N° d'UPType d'UP Unités pédagogiquesEnseignants Nombre d'heuresCrédits
19572Cours séminaire Law and Economics Dina WAKED, Sophia RIAHI244
21239Teaching assistant Law and Economics Sophia RIAHI——

Enseignants

  • Dina WAKED
  • Sophia RIAHI

Dans les maquettes

Contacts et ressources

Contact pédagogique
DESCHAMPS Elodie