AECO 22A10 - Microeconomics: Information, Design and Institutions
AECO 22A10 · Semestre d'automne 2026-2027
- Langue d'enseignement
- English
- Type d'enseignement
- Cours magistral
- Nombre d'heures
- 48
- Crédits
- 6
Informations
Descriptif
This course studies the design of institutions that optimally cope with fundamental, longstanding economic questions (allocation of private goods, public good provision, externalities). We start from a simple, institution-free description of each question, try to understand the basic tensions at work (for example environmental externalities), and derive institutions that optimally address these tensions (for instance systems of permits or taxes). In the process, we introduce the important ideas of social choice, game theory, and market design. We will shed light on the theoretical concepts using empirical applications and in-class games. The course will introduce formal tools,
using basic mathematical concepts, necessary to understand key economic concepts.
Format pédagogique
Two hour lecture by professor, including participation activities, on Wednesdays, 10:25-12:25.
There are also tutorials (traveau dirigés in French) held by the teaching assistant.
Mode de validation
The grading of the course is divided between 1/3 final exam and 2/3 continuous assessment.
The final exam is a two hours closed book exam. The continuous assessment, graded during the tutorials (TD), is broken down as follows:
- 40% — midterm exam, held around week 7.
- 30% — board corrections during tutorials. Solutions are distributed when the exercises are assigned, but you will be picked at random to present one of the exercises on the board in class.
- 30%—tutorial participation, including the Moodle quizzes completed between each lecture and the next.
Lectures
Lectures principales 1
-
Allcott, Hunt, Benjamin B. Lockwood, and Dmitry Taubinsky. 2019. “Should We Tax Sugar- Sweetened Beverages? An Overview of Theory and Evidence." Journal of Economic Perspectives 33 (3): 202–27. DOI: 10.1257/jep.33.3.202
Lectures secondaires 2
-
Gibbons, Robert. 1997. “An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1): 127–149. DOI: 10.1257/jep.11.1.127
-
Milgrom, Paul. 1989. “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (3): 3–22. DOI: 10.1257/jep.3.3.3
Unités pédagogiques
| N° d'UP | Type d'UP | Unités pédagogiques | Enseignants | Nombre d'heures | Crédits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13293 | Cours magistral | MICROECONOMICS: INFORMATION, DESIGN AND INSTITUTIONS | Keith HEAD | 24 | 6 |
| 13301 | Conférence | MICROECONOMICS: INFORMATION, DESIGN AND INSTITUTIONS | Tianxiang YUAN | 24 | 0 |
| 13302 | Conférence | MICROECONOMICS: INFORMATION, DESIGN AND INSTITUTIONS | Tianxiang YUAN | 24 | 0 |
Enseignants
- Keith HEAD
- Tianxiang YUAN
Dans les maquettes
- Asia-Pacific Minor Programme, Semester 3 2026-2027COLLÈGE UNIVERSITAIRE - CAMPUS LE HAVRE
Contacts et ressources
- Contact pédagogique
- BENOIT Aurélie