F1IS 4465 - Theoretical and experimental approaches to bargaining and conflict

This course offers an introduction of the formal and experimental tools that can be applied to the study of conflict. The course starts with an introduction to game theory “from scratch”. This includes how behavioral experiments have validated and often contradicted game-theoretic predictions. The second part of the course applies these tools to the study of interactions between countries or communities, including when they can resort to conflict to attain their goals. The course uses mostly the tools of applied game theory and experimental economics, although it also encompasses to some extent the scholarly traditions of political science and military strategy. The course requires little mathematics, but it is very important that students taking it are comfortable with formalities and abstraction, e.g. use of numbers and graphs.

Learning Outcomes

  1. Ability to reason and analyze conflict-related problems with economic tools
  2. Ability to design experiments to validate theories and produce new insights
  3. Ability to identify common forces in seemingly different conflict-related situations
  4. Ability to use theory and experiments to identify the essential factors in strategic interactions

Professional Skills

  • Learn to structure thoughts with economic reasoning and mechanisms
  • Learn the rudiments of economic experiments that can be used both in the lab and in the field
  • Improve group work and presentation skills
  • Improve writing skills
Santiago SANCHEZ-PAGES
Séminaire
English
  • In Class Presence: 2 hours a week / 24 hours a semester
  • Online learning activities:
  • Reading and Preparation for Class: 4 hours a week / 48 hours a semester
  • Research and Preparation for Group Work: 2 hours a week / 24 hours a semester
  • Research and Writing for Individual Assessments: 2 hours a week / 24 hours a semester
None
Spring 2025-2026

There are 3 assessments.

  • Writing a research paper (between 2500-3000 words) on a topic chosen by the student: 60% of final mark
  • Oral presentation in class, in groups of 2 or 3 students, on topics proposed by the instructor but chosen by the student. 30% of final mark
  • Participation in class (10%).
Feedback on students' presentations will be given via pre-specified forms containing the assessment criteria after presentations take place in the last sessions of the module. Marks and feedback will be made available to students no later than 4 weeks after the presentation session.
Feedback on research papers will be personalized and at least 200 words long, covering 5 pre-specified criteria; it will be made available to students no later than 4 weeks after the submission deadline.
Games of Strategy, Avinash Dixit, David Reiley and Susan Skeath, Norton, several editions.
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, Edited by Michelle R. Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, Oxford University Press, 2012, chapters 3, 4 & 22.
James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations of War. International Organization, 49:3, 379-414.
Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, Prajit K. Dutta, MIT Press 2000
Game Theory: An applied introduction, Jose Luis Ferreira, Macmillan 2019