DECO 25A39 - Corporate governance and contract theory

Firms are faced with informational and cognitive problems that threaten their efficiency and even their survival. The objective of this course is to show how contract and governance structures can answer these problems. We will explain how corporate firms, in their various forms, can be analyzed as networks of property rights; we will show how their different organizational designs can be explained by knowledge and information constraints. We will then analyze, through theoretical models (incentives, screening, signalling, etc.) and case studies (CEOs' remunerations), the way in which asymmetries of both information and knowledge have led to specific modes of executive governance and compensation.
Thierry AIMAR
Séminaire
English
Knowledge of these mathematical tools: - partial derivatives - optimization techniques
Autumn 2024-2025
Two written evaluations (in class) - Midterm test (40%) - Final exam (60%)
Contract Theory, P. Bolton, M. Dewatripont, The MIT Press.
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, JJ. Laffont, D.Martimort, Princeton University Press.