Social justice has been understood since Aristotle as a form of equality, or at least as inseparable from the drive to reduce inequalities (before the law, in the distribution of social goods, in compensation for natural inequalities, etc.). An overriding preoccupation with greater equality nevertheless exists in tension with two norms that have at least a reasonable claim to embody the values of a liberal democratic society: individual responsibility for one's choices (a theme developed in the writings of Ronald Dworkin); and personal autonomy understood as inseparable from the question of what cultural and social conditions enable individuals to make choices which are meaningful to them (associated in particular with the work of the legal philosopher Joseph Raz). Until relatively recently, a certain confidence in the ability of market mechanisms to endorse and enable the changes that justice requires has been common to all or most of these perspectives. In the contemporary world, however, even a modified egalitarian theory of justice faces powerful challenges both from those who contest its coherence and even its legitimacy (neoliberalism, identity and gender politics, communitarianism, nationalism) and from the physical realities of a world facing environmental calamity.